This paper is concerned with the axiomatization of success and failure in propositional logic programming. It deals with the actual implementation of SLDNF in PROLOG, as opposed to the general nondeterministic SLDNF evaluation method. Given any propositional program P, a linear theory LT, is defined (the linear translation of PI and the following results are proved for any literal A: soundness of PROLOG evuhation (if the goal A PROLOG-succeeds on P, then LT, kli,, A, and if A PROLOG-fails on P, then LT, I-,~" Al), and completeness of PROLOG evaluation (if LT, I-,~" A, then the goal A PROLOG-succeeds on P, and if LT, +,in A' , then A PROLOG-fails on PI. Here l-,in means provability in linear logic, and Al is the linear negation of A.
INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with the axiomatization of success and failure in propositional logic programming. One wants to prove something like Here we choose the second alternative. (The only works of this kind are [12] and [15] , as far as we know.)
The fact that (9 and (ii) lead to different answers is illustrated by the different treatment of the notion of failure for a propositional conjunctive query A AND B:
A AND B fails w.r.t. SLDNF when either A fails or B fails;
A AND B fails when either A (which is the first subgoal tested) fails, (Thus if A loops query A AND B fails w.r.t. SLDNF but does not fail w.r.t. PROLOG.)
There is a second choice to be made, namely between (iii) a nonlogical axiomatization and (iv) a logical one.
In the first case, what is given is a precise formal description of the evaluation algorithm considered, but no logical relation (in terms of connectives) between the several queries of a program is exhibited. This is the case, for example, of the formal calculus proposed in [12] . In the second case, one should use, if possible, a logical operation of negation to exchange success and failure, a logical operation of disjunction to express, for example, a statement like "either A fails or A succeeds," etc. Moreover, the axiomatization TMP) proposed for a given program P should be as modular as possible, in the sense that a local modification of the program P should induce just a local modification of TMP). For example, Clark's completion, which has been proposed as an axiomatization w.r.t. SLDNF, is modular in,the sense that if one modifies just the clauses of head A of a given program P, only the component "definition of A" has to be modified in Camp(P) [2] . Here, we make the choice (iv). Now the question is: which logic may one use to formulate TMP)? There are some difficulties to face:
(a) (b) Classical logic cannot be used, since there are situations where we need a commutation of the connectives with provability which classical logic does not provide: typically, the classical provability of A V B does not imply that either A is provable or B is provable (see Example 1 below).
Intuitionistic logic obviates the above difficulty but is far from being free of defects. In contrast with classical logic, it lacks an involutive negation (i.e., the double negation of A is not equivalent to A); therefore it is not able to express the exchange of success and failure. Moreover, it joins classical logic in leading to some undesired situations which are illustrated by Example 2 below.
In both classical and intuitionistic logic there is a hidden principle, namely Gentzen's "contraction rule" (see [3}, [61, or [8] ), which seems to be responsible for some of the inadequacies of the axiomatizations so far proposed (for example Clark's completion: see the examples below). When we remove contraction (and also another rule, namely weakening), we obtain linear logic (see 151 and [7] ). This last is the logic that we have chosen.
This paper proves the following result by using linear logic: given any propositional PROLOG program P, there is a theory LT, such that for any propositional Soundness of propositional PROLOG evaluation. If A PROLOG-succeeds on P, then A is a theorem of LT,, and if A PROLOG-fails on P, then the negation of A is a theorem of LT,. Completeness of propositional PROLOG evaluation. If A is a theorem of LT,, then A PROLOG-succeeds on P, and if the negation of A is a theorem of LT,, then A PROLOG-fails on P. Now let us go into more detailed explanations. First of all, let us see some examples which show the kind of difficulties that classical logic and intuitionistic logic cannot solve. The query R PROLOG-loops on this program (and indeed, also SLDNF-loops: the specific search strategy used by PROLOG does not play an essential role here). Now, given the way in which negation is implemented (namely by the negationas-failure rule), one may expect that an axiomatization via classical logic of this program will contain something like
R~*(PVTP)
and P++P as theorems (these are actually the axioms of Clark's completion). Thus, R will be a theorem, since P v -I P is classically valid. The point is that PROLOG's internal logic is such that a disjunction A V B is "provable" if and only if either A is "provable" or B is "provable", and classical disjunction does not behave like that. Notice that any proof of the excluded-middle principle in the Gentzen formalization of classical logic does essentially use the contraction rule.
Example 2. Let P2 be the trivial program whose only clause is A :-NOT(A). The query A PROLOG-loops for this program (and, indeed, SLDNF-loops too). However, it is reasonable to ask for A * 7 A to be a theorem of any logical axiomatization of this program (once again, this is the case for Clark's completion), so that if the underlying logic is classical or intuitionistic, we will get an inconsistent theory which trivially proves A. Notice that in the absence of the contraction rule the provability of A+TA and TA*A does not lead to the provability of every formula (see Section III for a more detailed discussion).
So far, we have seen two difficulties which haunt the axiomatization of some programs where the specific PROLOG search strategy does not play any essential role (which therefore also exploit the possibility of fully axiomatizing SLDNF via classical or intuitionistic logic). But there are also problems which are specific to PROLOG and which are illustrated by the following example. Example 3. Let P3 be the program whose only clause is A :-A, B. Given the selection rule of standard PROLOG, which treats literals in the body of a clause from left to right, we have that the query A loops on P3. (Of course, if another selection rule were chosen, A would fail.) A fair axiomatization of this PROLOG program should be able to express the following facts:
(1) A fails if either A fails or A succeeds and B fails, (2) B fails. Now, a translation of (1) and (2) into logic language will give us and if one uses classic or intuitionistic logic, one will prove 7 A.
The above examples should clarify why we have chosen linear logic for our axiomatization rather than classical or intuitionistic logic. The kind of proof theory used is linear sequent calculus; it is described in this paper, but some familiarity with Gentzen classical and intuitionistic calculi is assumed (see [3] , [6] , or [8] ).
We will use the sequent notation
A l,...,A,t-B
rather than the standard expression B :-A,, . . . , A, to denote a clause whose head is B and whose body is A,, . . . , A,.
Plan of the Paper
This paper is organized as follows:
Section I: Description of the tools that we use (quick description of linear logic and definition of the system LL). Section ZZ: Formulation and proof of our results.
Section ZZZ: Discussion.
I. THE TOOLS THAT WE USE: LINEAR LOGIC
We give here a quick survey of the basic ideas of linear logic, and we introduce the formal system that we will use. is true. In an intuitionistic sequent A contains at most one formula. This restriction has an immediate effect on the inference rules; for example, in the intuitionistic calculus one no longer has the right-contraction rule. The modifications brought about by the linear approach to the classical calculus are more dramatic: basically the sequents keep the same form as in the classical case, but the structural rules of weakening and contraction are eliminated from the calculus, and this seemingly local modification has far reaching consequences for the structure of the whole calculus and for the very nature of the logical connectives. But let us go to the core of the matter. In the presence of the structural rules of weakening, Of course, these two distinct conjunctions do not represent truth functions, because it is well known that there are exactly 16 binary boolean operators and that all of them are definable in terms of standard negation, conjunction, and disjunction. Evidently, the semantics of the linear connectives Q and & is not the usual Tarski one (see [5] for a formal definition of such semantics). However, it is not so surprising that there are propositional connectives which are not truth-functional: the meaning of intuitionistic connectives cannot be explained in terms of truth either, but rather via Heyting's semantics of proofs (see [8] ).
The difference between the two linear conjunctions may be roughly explained as follows. Linear logic is sensitive to how many times a formula is used as hypothesis in a proof; thus, using a formula C twice as. hypothesis in a linear proof of a formula A from some hypotheses I actually counts as using rwo hypotheses of the form C. In other words, a set of hypotheses I should be seen as a set of occurrences of formulas rather then as a set of formulas. Now, in order to have a proof .9 of A 0 B from some hypotheses I, a proof _9i of A and a proof _!?S2 of B have to be joined; I will be the set of occurrences of formulas obtained by taking the union of the hypotheses used in _9i and the hypotheses used in _5S2. For example, if we have a proof of A which uses the hypothesis C exactly once and a proof of B which uses the hypothesis C exactly once:
then we have a proof of C, C + A 8 B, but we do not have a proof of C I-A @ B, because C is used twice in the pair (_?Si, .9r). On the other hand, in order to have a proof _53 of A & B from I, we must have a proof 9, of A and a proof 9, of B where each one of the two proofs uses exactly I as set of hypotheses; _9 "proposes a choice" between .9i and 9,. Thus, if we take 9, and 2S2 as in the above example, we have a proof of C I-A &B, but we do not have a proof of C, C t-A & B, because C is used once in _9i and the same happens with 9,. In other terms, C I-A &B means "using C once, you can get either A or B, as you wish".
In [7] Girard suggests the following story to give some intuition about the meaning of the two linear conjunctions: take C to be "I spend one dollar", A to be "I can get a packet of Marlboros", B to be "I can get a packet of Camels"; then C + A @J B may be read as "For one dollar I can get a packet of Marlboros and a packet of Camels" and is false, where C, C I-A 8 B may be read as "For two dollars I can get a packet of Marlboros and a packet of Camels". On the other hand, C I-A & B says "For one dollar I can get a packet of Marlboros; for one dollar I can also get a packet of Camels; however, I must make a choice between the two possibilities because one dollar suffices just for one packet of cigarettes". Notice that & is not a disjunction: in order to prove A & B both a proof of A and a proof of B must be available, and the following linear sequents are valid:
We have two right rules for the "plus" disjunction:
It is easy to see from the above rules that Q behaves as an intuitionistic disjunction: a proof 23 of A d B from the empty set of hypotheses is either a proof of A or a proof of B.
On the other hand, the "par" disjunction has a rather classical flavor: a proof of A IB B tells us that either A holds or B holds but does not tell us which one. Its right rule is the following:
A proof .9 of A 78 B from r behaves in such a way that if a proof of A L from r' is provided, then a proof of B from I, r' is obtained, and if a proof of B ' from r" is provided, then a proof of A from I, r" is obtained.
The connectives So far we have seen the propositional linear connectives. With linear logic one wants to be able to make finer distinctions than in classical or intuitionistic logic (for example between @ and la); however, one does not want to lose the expressive power of intuitionistic calculus. This is why the so-called exponential modalities:
? (read "why not?") are introduced: by their means it is possible to translate intuitionistic logic into linear logic (see [5] ). Intuitively, "! A" means that we can have as many occurrences of type A as we want (a more suitable name for this modality might be ad Zibitum). The modality ? is the dual of !. Finally, there are the linear quantifiers, which have more or less the standard meaning. However, in this paper we will work just with the finite propositional fragment of linear logic, which contains neither exponentials nor quanitifers.
Linear logic has two proof systems, namely linear sequenr calculus and proof new here, we use the first one. Also linear implication is a defined symbol:
The System LL
A (right-handed) linear sequent of [I is an expression of the form I-I', where r is a finite sequence of formulas G,, . . . , G, of [L; the implicitly defined meaning of the linear sequent I-r is G, 78 G, * * * G,,_, 38 G,,.
Logical axioms:
I-A,Al.
Cut rule:
Exchange rule: +r -
where P' is a permutation of P. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION
1. By a straightforward adaptation of the standard proof of cut elimination for Gentzen classical calculus (see [6] or [8] (9 a subformula of a formula in A, or
(ii) a formula in a sequent of H or (iii) the linear negation of a subformula of a formula in a sequent of H.
2. As for Gentzen's calculus, the subformula property is a corollary of the cut-elimination theorem. Let 9 be the proof of I-A from H given by Proposition 1. A rather straightforward induction on the height h of _9 shows that _9 satisfies the conditions of Proposition 3. q 

3.
The reader can find semantical proofs of the above properties in [5] ; here we give syntactical proofs just of the first two properties.
In order to prove property (9, we must prove that: 
I-A@(B~BC),A~,B~ I-Ao(B@C),AL,C* (78) (,T) t-As(B@C),A178BL
kA@(BeC),A%'C* (8d
t_A~(B8C),(A'~B*)&(A*~CI) (EXCH)
In order to prove (ii) we must prove the sequents
I-(A'e(BQP)),(A78B)&(A&C), (Y) I-(AL@BL)@(AQKL),A18(B&C).
(6) It suffices to remark that moduio the replacement of the formulas A, B,C with their duals A I, B I, C I, the sequent (7) is just a permutation of the sequent (PI, and the sequent (8) is just a permutation of the sequent C(Y).
II. SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS OF PROLOG
II.I. Translating a PROLOG Program P into IL
Let P be a normal PROLOG program. Our goal is to provide a "translation" LT, of a PROLOG program P in II in such a way that LT, "expresses" what it means for an atomic goal A to PROLOG-succeed with respect to P and what it means for A to PROLOG-fail. We recall that the search strategy over the clauses that we consider is the standard PROLOG one, namely, the clauses are tried in the order in which they are written, and that to evaluate a goal B the atoms in the body of the clause Let C be a goal for Pd. The situation in which C succeeds at the first attempt (namely, when the first clause with head C is tried) can be described by the linear formula:
because the success of C is caused by the success of A followed by the success of B. When C succeeds at the second attempt (after failure of the first one), we have that either A has failed or A has been successful but B has failed (failure w.r.t. the first clause), and both D and E have been successful, namely, Clearly, PROLOG never tests the last clause. We define the success set of the atom C as the set s,= (a,b,c}.
The program P4 will halt with failure of C if all the clauses of P4 fail; here, such a situation cannot arise [thanks to the presence of the clause (311; thus, the failure set of the atom C is empty:
If we apply the distributivity of 6~ with respect to $, we can rewrite S, as the set of formulas whose elements are Example 5. Let Ps be such that the only clauses with head C are:
(
1) A, NOT(B) I-C, (2) D, NOT(E) k c.
The success of the negative goal NO~B) is the same thing as the failure of B, and its failure is the same thing as the success of B (likewise for E). Thus the success set for C is given by
S,= (A@B' -_&(A%(Aci3B))s(DsEL)-C).
Here we have
Fc={(AL@(AeB))e(DL@(D@E))-CL},
because Ps halts with failure of C when all the clauses of Ps with head C fail. The set SFq now has as elements One may observe that it would be possible to formulate LT, in such a way to have a much smaller number of axioms. For example, in the case of the program P5 above, one might choose the sequents
t-A8BL-,C, I-(A'~(A@B))@(D@E~),C
as components of the set SFq, and the sequent
~(A*b(A8B))s(DI~(D~E)),C')
as the unique component of the set Fyq. The advantage of having just sequents which do not contain any connective as nonlogical axioms of the linear theory LT, is that it is particularly easy to study the structure of sequent proofs where all the axioms have such a form.
The discussion of the examples given above should suffice to motivate the following definitions. Let AU(P) be the set of the atoms of a program P, and let A be an element of AU(P). Let Clauses(A) be the sequence of clauses of P whose head is A, taken in their order of appearance in the program P.
Let B,, . . Intuitively, a sequent in FTq says that if:
.) B, I-A be the jth element of Clauses(A). Let (B$ be F if Bi is a positive literal F, and FL if Bj is NOT(F).
( 
I-B',A,DI,C',E, k-B,D',C',E, I-B,DL,C,Ei, t-B,D,E', I-BI,A,D',C,El, I-B',A,D,E', t-AA, k-BBI, t-CL, kDL.
Notice that the translation LT, is modular, i.e., if just those clauses of P whose head is A are modified, only the component DA of LT, will be modified.
Soundness and Completeness of PROLOG
Let P be a normal propositional PROLOG program and A a literal of P. We get the following theorems:
Theorem 1 (Completeness of PROLOG).
(a) Zf I-A is LL-prouuble from LT,, then the goal A PR/OLOG-succeeds on P.
(b) If I-A 1 is LL-provable from LT,,, then the goal A PROLOG-fails on P.
Theorem 2 (Soundness of PROLOG).
(a) If A PROLOG-succeeds on P, then I-A is LL-provable from LT,.
(b) If A PROLOG-fails on P, then I-A' is LL-prouable from LT,,.
(In the above formulation of our theorems, we identify the NOT operator occurring in a literal A of P with the linear negation operator '.I These two theorems may be seen respectively as a completeness result and a soundness result for the PROLOG evaluation algorithm with respect to the notion of linear logical consequence of the set of nonlogical axioms of LT,; the theory LT, gives a semantics to the program P and plays a role w.r.t. PROLOG somewhat similar to the one that Clark's completion is intended to play w.r.t. SLDNF.
To prove Theorem 1 we need a lemma. This remark suggests the following reading for S:
If A PROLOG-succeeds on P and B PROLOG-succeeds on P, then C PROLOG-succeeds on P.
Lemma l(a) tells us that such a reading is correct. Now let us select the literal B L in S. We can write S as which is also correct. In other words, Lemma l(a) tells us that one can read any sequent in LT, as expressing the relations of success and failure between its atoms. In particular, when the sequent S has the form +A, then it may be read as "A PROLOG-succeeds", and when S has the form t-AL, then it may be read as "A PROLOG-fails".
Part (b) of the lemma essentially says that if the reading above suggested is correct for the sequents which are the premises of a cut rule or an exchange rule, then it is also correct for the sequent which is the conclusion of such a rule. It is interesting to notice that (b) would no longer be trUe if we considered also the contraction rule. For example, consider the program P whose only clause is
NOT(A)
I-A. The sequent I-A, A is an element of LT,, and may be correctly read as "if A PROLOG-fails on P then A PROLOG-succeeds on P". However, if we contract such a sequent to I-A, the reading "A PROLOG-succeeds on P" is false. This suggests that an attempt to construct LT, as a set of classical or linear sequents would not work (see below h.ow we use Lemma 1 to get a proof of Theorem 1, and see also the discussion of some specific examples in Section III). 
(Completeness of PROLOG)
. Since a query NOT(A) succeeds when A fails and fails when A succeeds, and since the linear formula A" is the same thing as A, it suffices to prove the theorem for any positive literal A of P. Thus, let A be a positive literal such that t-A is a theorem of LT,. By Proposition 2, we get that there is a proof 9 of k A such that any formula occurring in _9 is either A, or a formula occurring in a sequent of LT,, or the linear negation of a subformula of a formula occurring in a sequent of LT,. Thus, since sequents of LT, are sequents of literals and for any propositional letter P the linear negation of P ' is just P, we have that each formula occurring in _9 is a literal. It follows that the only rules used in 9 are cut and exchange. Thus, by Lemma 1, the sentence A* is true, that is, A PROLOG-succeeds on P. The same argument shows that if I-A 1 is a theorem of LT,, then A PROLOG-fails on P. 
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is clear that the notion of success in the standard formulations of SLDNF completeness and soundness is different from our notion of PROLOG success; there, "A succeeds" means that there is a way of performing a search which leads to the answer TRUE for A, while the sense in which the term "success" is used in our theorems is linked to a fixed search procedure, the standard PROLOG one. Our translation of a given PROLOG p.rogram P is done in such a way as to build in not only the declarative meaning of the clauses of P, but also a logical description of such a procedure. Notice that if one wanted to construct different linear translations for propositional PROLOG programs which use different search strategies, in principle this could be done. Now let us see how our approach deals with the "difficult" examples given in the introduction.
First, we have considered the program P,:
(1) PI-R (2) NOT(P) I-R Here LTpZ is Neither t--A ' nor i--A 1 is a theorem of such a theory (contraction is forbidden).
As a matter of fact, unlike Clark's completion of Pz, LTpZ is consistent and admits nontrivial models (see [5] for the model theory of linear logic).
We considered also the program P3, whose only clause is A, B t-A. There the problem was that a good axiomatization of such a program should not have the negation of A as a theorem. Our set of sequents LTq, has the following elements:
kAl,Bl,A, I-A,A', I-AI,B,AI, t-B I,
and the sequent I-A L is not provable (the sequent I-A ', A L is indeed provable, but we cannot contract such a sequent). Now let us play the devil's advocate. A false impression that could arise from a quick reading of our work is that the ability of our translation LT, to reflect PROLOG success and failure does not depend on the specificity of linear logic: LT, is just a paraphrase of how (standard) PROLOG searches through the clauses of P, and if one were replacing linear connectives by classical ones, one would obtain a translation Cr, which would work as well as LT,, to get Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Discussing the meaning of Lemma 1, we have already observed that the absence of contraction, which is specific to linear logic, does play an essential role in the proof of our results. Moreover we have seen that if we were handling the axioms of LTp, as classical or intuitionists sequents, we would get an inconsistent theory. That example was quite interesting because it clearly showed the specific role played by linear logic in our translation, independently of the specific way in which the PROLOG strategy has been axiomatized. Below, we give two additional examples to show once again that if our axioms were treated as classical or intuitionistic sequents, then we would get into trouble; both these examples consider programs where the PROLOG search strategy does play an important role. 
I-B
Notice that the use of the contraction rule plays an essential role in the above classical proof. The next example shows, once again, that we cannot treat the sequents of our axiomatization as intuitionistic sequents either.
Example 3 Recisited. Let us consider once again the program Pj seen above, whose only clause is A, B t-A.
We have already seen that once PROLOG tries to answer the question A, a loop occurs, and that the sequent I-AL is not LL-derivable from the linear translation of P3. (By the way, observe that if the atoms B and A appear in reverse order in the body of the clause, the goal A finitely fails and LTq, is modified in such a way that t-A 1 is LL-derivable.) Now consider the corresponding intuitionistic translation for P+ IT~3={B,A~-A,4t-~A,A,~Bt-lA,+ TB}.
Here is an intuitionistic proof of + 7 A from ITq,:
k -lB A,lBt-1A
At--lA Let us conclude this discussion with a few words of comparison between our work and some related results.
In [12] and [15] Mints proposes an axiomatization for PROLOG evaluation which applies to the general class of first-order logic programs; PROLOG is sound and complete with respect to such an axiomatization. As we already said, the main difference between Mints's approach and our approach is that Mints's axiomatization is a formal calculus which provides a paraphrase of PROLOG evaluation, rather than a logical theory which analyses such an evaluation by means of logical operators of negation, conjunction, disjunction, etc. The advantage of Mints's axiomatization is that it is not limited to propositional programs, while its weakness-in our opinion-lies in its rather ad hoc nature. In [lo] it is shown that SLDNF evaluation on allowed programs (and queries) is sound and complete with respect to Clark's completion if one takes the underlying logic to be a specific version of three-valued logic rather than classical logic. In particular, SLDNF is sound and complete for propositional programs. The obvious difference between Kunen's approach and the approach of the present paper lies in the different aims: here we are interested in the axiomatization of a specific implementation of SLDNF, namely PROLOG, rather than in the general SLDNF evaluation. However, in [l] we indeed propose a linear version of Clark's completion as semantics for the general SLDNF nondeterministic evaluation, and we prove the soundness and completeness of SLDNF with respect such a semantics under the same hypothesis on programs and queries as Kunen's, namely allowedness. In that paper we compare extensively the linear-completion approach and the three-valued-completion approach with respect to the problem of finding a good logical axiomatization of SLDNF.
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